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Abstract
We apply an ensemble pipeline composed of
a character-level convolutional neural network
(CNN) and a long short-term memory (LSTM)
as a general tool for addressing a range of dis-
information problems. We also demonstrate the
ability to use this architecture to transfer knowl-
edge from labeled data in one domain to related
(supervised and unsupervised) tasks. Character-
level neural networks and transfer learning are
particularly valuable tools in the disinformation
space because of the messy nature of social media,
lack of labeled data, and the multi-channel tactics
of influence campaigns. We demonstrate their ef-
fectiveness in several tasks relevant for detecting
disinformation: spam emails, review bombing,
political sentiment, and conversation clustering.
1. Introduction
Electronic communication is more embedded and essential
to human life than ever before. This communication in-
creasingly relies on the distributed, self-publishing model
of social media platforms. The increasing ease of dis-
tributed communication does not come without drawbacks:
disinformation—deceptive information spread deliberately
to change behavior, influence public opinion, or obscure
the truth—has infiltrated the online information ecosystem,
with damaging consequences (Carvalho et al., 2011; Mo-
canu et al., 2015).
Malicious electronic communication takes many forms. It
spans from low-level social engineering attacks (i.e., phish-
ing) to more sophisticated, distributed efforts to disseminate
state propaganda (Inkster, 2016; Okoro & Nwafor, 2013;
Woolley, 2016). We propose that the language characteris-
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tics of known and identified sources of malicious electronic
communication can be used as a signal for the detection and
mitigation of these efforts across the diverse (and fractured)
electronic communication ecosystem.
The motivation of this work is to demonstrate how semantic
classification of natural language can be used as a tool for
the detection of inflammatory, inauthentic, or otherwise
nefarious communication. Character-level convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) are particularly well-suited for
this task—as opposed to a word-level model—because they
allow for non-vernacular discourse, misspelling, and other
social media features (e.g., emoticons) to be learned without
the constraint of fixed vocabularies (Zhang et al., 2015). We
implement an adaptation of a neural network architecture
recently demonstrated to be effective for text classification
(Zhang et al., 2015; Jo´zefowicz et al., 2016). The method
is purely content-based and does not require any additional
metadata beyond the text. To show the effectiveness of
this method in relation to malicious communication and
disinformation, we present a series of experimental results
on semantic classification for spam emails, review bombing,
political sentiment, and conversation clustering.
2. Related Work
The way people consume and produce information online
looks radically different today than it did in the recent past
(Del Vicario et al., 2016). This change has introduced a
societal-level vulnerability—where foreign entities have
been accused of interfering in the operations of sovereign
democracies (Inkster, 2016; Okoro & Tsgyu, 2017; Woolley,
2016; Peruzzi et al., 2018). Even internally in various states,
political differences have encouraged inauthentic, organized
disinformation campaigns to attack brands (Visentin et al.,
2019; Berthon et al., 2018). This situation has led to an in-
creased interest in studying the dissemination of inauthentic
and/or false information to find solutions that protect the
integrity of online discourse and the democratic institutions
that depend on it. We believe that a computational technique
that can use the properties of electronic discourse for the
purpose of identifying key characteristics (e.g., source, in-
tent, and effect) can be effective for addressing this complex
problem.
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Few frameworks have been proposed to detect and/or mon-
itor malicious communication. One existing approach is
HOAXY, a platform designed to collect, detect, and visual-
ize the online spread of misinformation and fact-checking
(Shao et al., 2016). TRUTHY (another approach) uses net-
work analysis techniques to track political memes for the
purpose of detecting misinformation in U.S. political elec-
tions (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011). It includes an automated
system that assesses the credibility of posts on social media
using content-based features and user metadata (Castillo
et al., 2011).
Motivated by computational journalism, FACTWATCHER
helps journalists identify newsworthy facts supported by
data that can serve as leading news stories (Hassan et al.,
2014). Another attempt to fact-check simple statements
employs the use of a public knowledge graph extracted from
Wikipedia, framing the problem in terms of network analysis
(Ciampaglia et al., 2015). There have also been efforts
to create automated fact-checking systems for multimedia,
where the goal is to distinguish between fake and real images
using classification models based on user features and post
content (Boididou et al., 2014; Gupta et al., 2013). Platforms
that focus on the veracity of claims more broadly—e.g.,
POLITIFACT.COM and FACTCHECK.ORG—rate the accuracy
of claims made in political debates, speeches, and ads. More
recently, computational resources and models to detect fake
news have been developed which rely on linguistic features
(Pe´rez-Rosas et al., 2017).
Current research in this domain includes tracking and ana-
lyzing the diffusion of rumors. RUMORLENS is a suite of
interactive tools to help identify rumors on social media and
analyze their impact (Resnick et al., 2014). Similarly, TWIT-
TERTRAILS allows users to automatically answer questions
about rumors on Twitter (e.g., origin, propagators, main
actors, etc.) and compute level of visibility (Metaxas et al.,
2015). Another rumor-checking website is SNOPES.COM
which focuses on urban legends and hoaxes.
3. Current Approach
The work surveyed above is notable for its goal of address-
ing a difficult problem with the use of all possible features.
In the same sense, however, a limitation of this work is
its reliance on complete and detailed information from the
platform (i.e., most often the TWITTER platform, which
makes available metadata and network graph characteris-
tics). There is a current need, therefore, for an approach
that can successfully classify content of interest across plat-
forms, with only the text content as input and in the absence
of any exogenous features—features that cannot be relied
on consistently in cross-platform analysis. Our proposed
method is a multi-label, multi-class semantic classifier able
to successfully handle natural language across platforms.
The capability to handle naturalistic social language—e.g.,
emoticons, slang, misspellings—at the character-level gives
this framework potential to be a powerful tool in detecting
malicious communication from peer-to-peer social engi-
neering to distributed disinformation across the electronic
communication ecosystem.
3.1. Neural Network Architecture Overview
Depictions of the architectural inspiration for the current
approach1 are presented in Figure 2 (see Zhang et al., 2015;
Jo´zefowicz et al., 2016 for in-depth architecture informa-
tion). It consists of two coupled deep neural networks—a
network that encodes each individual sentence and a net-
work that classifies the entire document.
Figure 1. Diagram of character-level CNN model architecture. Fig-
ure reproduced from Zhang et al., 2015.
Figure 2. Word- and character-level models for text generation.
This work uses the encoder from (b). Figure reproduced from
Jo´zefowicz et al., 2016.
The first network consists of 13 convolutional, max-pooling,
dropout and bidirectional LSTM layers. Characters of an
input sentence are one-hot encoded from a dictionary of
71 characters and bounded by a maximum length (tunable,
depending on the application). It produces the final sentence
encoding (a 512-dimensional feature vector).
1Source code: https://github.com/NewKnowledge/simon
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The second network, which classifies the document as a
whole, consists of 7 convolutional, max-pooling, dropout,
and bidirectional LSTM layers. The input is again bounded
by a maximum number of sentences (a tunable parameter).
The final layer outputs the probabilities of classifying the
document as each different type of class.
4. Empirical Assessment
Three examples are provided below to showcase how the
CNN–LSTM classification approach can be applied to do-
mains of interest. The final section describes how the pro-
cess can be generalized to conduct unsupervised conver-
sation clustering. The procedure is similar across applica-
tions: (1) initial weights are learned with training on the
language(s) of the target domain and—if necessary—(2)
transfer learning with labeled data is performed to learn the
specific classes of interest (e.g., spam vs. ham, on-topic vs.
off-topic review content, etc.).
4.1. Spam Email
Peer-to-peer social engineering attacks constitute a major
threat vector at individual, business, and geopolitical levels.
Perhaps the most benign example of this threat is commer-
cial spam. Thus, a good starting point for assessment is
testing the applicability of the CNN–LSTM architecture
to this problem. In addition to being able to classify an
email as spam or authentic, this use case can be extended
to build a multi-label, multi-class classifier that differen-
tiates between a broader set of attacks, e.g., propaganda
and social engineering emails vs. phishing. We employ
the transfer-learning paradigm to adapt the initial classes to
a more sophisticated problem—first learning to determine
if the originator of a piece of electronic communication is
a friend or foe, and then learning to identify the specific
class of adversarial communication best attributed to the
document (see Figure 4 in the Supplementary Material).
The classifier is initially trained on the popular Enron email
dataset 2, the 419 spam fraud corpus 3, and an email abuse
dataset acquired from NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL). A dataset balanced between two classes (friend and
foe) was generated with 7000 samples of each class. The
model converged with a test binary accuracy of 96.14%.
Then transfer learning is applied to the original binary clas-
sifier to complete the training of a full multi-class classifier,
augmenting the number of handled classes from 2 to 8 with
reduced labeled data and computing power requirements.
The 8 classes are: friend, 419 scam, malware, credential
2www.kaggle.com/wcukierski/
enron-email-dataset
3www.kaggle.com/rtatman/
fraudulent-email-corpus
phishing, phishing training, propaganda, social engineer-
ing, and spam. As shown in Figure 4 in the Supplementary
Material, the accuracy convergences quickly to a test accu-
racy of 93.25%. Corresponding precision was calculated as
0.96, recall as 0.49, and F1 score as 0.65. This performance,
using email text only, provides further evidence of the effec-
tiveness of transfer learning in natural language processing
(NLP), which still remains relatively under-explored in this
space (Rodriguez et al., 2018).
4.2. Review Bombing
An important use-case for combating disinformation is the
ability to detect inauthentic behaviors and campaigns used
to threaten the integrity and good reputation of a product,
company, or brand. For example, the perceived quality of
products on marketplace-based websites can be manipu-
lated through fake reviews (Goswami et al., 2017). Like-
wise, movie reviews can be manipulated through coordi-
nated campaigns that have the goal to negatively impact
box office numbers and revenue—so-called review bombing.
One approach to combating this manipulation is to identify
off-topic reviews, reviews that are not relevant to the prod-
uct but take on peripheral issues (e.g., political stances of
organizations or athletic endorsers).
To test the usefulness of CNN–LSTM based semantic classi-
fication in this domain, our method was trained on on-topic
vs. off-topic movie reviews collected from a popular, crowd-
sourced review website. The initial convergence results
achieve a binary test accuracy of 99.5%. These results
suggest that this technique is a promising approach for de-
tecting inauthentic behaviors for manipulation of products
and brands.
4.3. Political Sentiment
Due to the central role social media platforms fill as critical
communication infrastructure, malicious actors now have
the ability to construct and disseminate false narratives with
broad implications for society—often by piggybacking on
polarizing content or current events. This behavior has sig-
nificant and harmful effects (Nied et al., 2017), muddying
the ability to use social media as a means to understand
broad trends in preferences and behavior. To be able to
combat fraudulent or misleading narratives, it is critical to
be able to characterize the content as intentionally harm-
ful (negative/anti), intentionally favorable (positive/pro), or
neutral.
Semantic classification was applied to posts discussing
Howard Schultz’ potential presidential election campaign
using the text of the post only. A three-class classifier—
Pro, Anti, or Neutral—was used. From a corpus containing
approximately 6,000 supportive posts, 20,000 negative or
harmful posts, and 40,000 neutral posts, we sampled 4,000
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posts from each category.
Figure 5 in the Supplementary Material presents the training
results on the political sentiment task. The model attained a
binary test accuracy of 88.10%. Notably, the accuracy of the
classification of negative and/or harmful posts is perfectly
(100%) accurate. Corresponding precision, at a threshold
probability of 0.5, was calculated as 0.68, recall as 0.98, and
F1 score as 0.81. The ROC curve is also presented in Figure
5. We note that no hyper-parameter tuning was performed,
which suggests that these metrics are amenable to further
improvement.
4.4. Conversation Clustering
The current approach can also learn features that are useful
for exploratory data analysis. The ability to examine the
structure and trends of online discourse provides critical
context for detecting and understanding the large-scale dis-
information campaigns. We use the latent space generated
by a pre-trained model to cluster conversations and visualize
the results.
Figure 3. t-SNE embedding on Enron and 419 spam email datasets.
An example is shown in Figure 3, which depicts a t-
Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) cluster-
ing of the 128-dimensional features that the model learned
from training on the Enron email dataset and the 419 spam
fraud corpus. The features effectively separate the two
classes and illustrates the increased variability in the Enron
class as opposed to the spam class.
5. General Discussion
5.1. Limitations and Alternatives
One criticism of this work is that a simpler approach to text
classification might be capable of achieving similar levels
of performance. Indeed, methods such as bag-of-words
and bag-of-ngrams models have comparable performance
(Zhang et al., 2015) on many supervised tasks. However, we
assert that the latent representation learned by the proposed
approach better captures nuance in discourse than the bag-
of-ngrams representation and, consequently, is better suited
for transfer learning and exploratory tasks. The choice
of a character-level CNN over the common approach of
using word embedding spaces allows for misspelling, slang,
unconventional characters (e.g., emoticons), and anomalous
or unique vocabulary usage. These advantages are uniquely
suited for the purpose of analyzing and tracking discourse
patterns that are not represented in mainstream discourse.
5.2. Ongoing Work
The applications above begin to address small parts of the
disinformation problem. We think of these as pieces of a
broader approach necessary to effectively combat disinfor-
mation. Towards that goal, we have an ongoing effort that
examines the dynamics of language usage across communi-
ties and social platforms. The kind of document embedding
used above for transfer learning and clustering can also
be used to measure the similarity of language use across
communities, track changes in language use over time, and
identify potential sources of those changes (e.g. adopting
slang present in another platform or community, indicating
a diffusion of ideas between the two groups).
5.3. Conclusion
We present a character-level CNN–LSTM model as an ef-
fective general-purpose tool for exploration and inference
tasks relevant to disinformation on social media. As demon-
strated in Section 4, the model is able to learn a generic
vector-space representation from a rich labeled dataset, then
be utilized in label-scarce settings (common in the disinfor-
mation space) via transfer learning. The representation is
also useful in an exploratory setting, which is important for
understanding and adapting to the rapidly changing social
media ecosystem. The flexibility of this framework to cre-
ate a compact representation of natural language across a
variety of communication channels by analyzing character-
to-character contingencies makes it a powerful tool with
broad potential to affect the quality and integrity of online
discourse.
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Figure 4. Convergence and performance results for the email spam classification task.
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Figure 5. Convergence and performance results for the narrative categorization task.
